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THE RULE OF GOOD LAW  
FORM, SUBSTANCE, AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 
MICHAEL P. FORAN 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper explores the effect that conformity to the rule of law has on 
the ends which might legitimately be pursued within a legal system. The neat 
distinction between formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law will be 
challenged: even apparently formal conceptions necessarily affect the content of law 
and necessarily entail the protection of certain fundamental rights. What remains 
of the formal/substantive dichotomy is, in fact, a distinction between conceptions of 
the rule of law which guarantee the substantive justice of each and every law and 
those which entail some commitment to basic requirements of justice while 
nevertheless leaving room for unjust laws. Ultimately, the only significant 
distinction between competing theories of the rule of law concerns the nature of the 
connection between legality and justice, not whether there is any such connection 
at all.  
 




The rule of law is often characterised as a political ideal to which every legal 
system, regardless of its substantive aims, must aspire and against which 
all legal systems may be judged.1 This is particularly true of “formal” 
conceptions of the rule of law which are seen as speaking only to legal form 
and the methods of promulgation and application of legal rules.2 Formal 
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conceptions are often portrayed as somehow politically neutral. More 
precisely, they are said to constitute the threshold conditions for a valid 
legal system, while nevertheless remaining neutral as to the substantive 
ends that may be pursued by law.3 This characterisation ensures that the 
rule of law can carry political weight to pressure certain regimes to treat 
their subjects better without being dismissed as a product of western or 
liberal-democratic values.  
 In contrast, substantive theories are seen as expanding upon the 
formal or procedural limitations contained within formal theories by 
establishing a number of fundamental rights which are said to be based on, 
or derived from, the values which underpin the rule of law, and which 
affect and limit the substantive aims of law.4 Within the context of British 
constitutional law, the rule of law forms a core part of common law 
principle and is increasingly used in judicial review decisions to underpin 
specific heads of review and to justify the operation of judicial review more 
generally.5 In particular, the concept incorporates both formal and 
substantive elements which the legislature is presumed not to contravene. 
As Lord Steyn notes, “[u]nless there is the clearest provision to the contrary, 
Parliament must be presumed not to legislate contrary to the rule of law. 
And the rule of law enforces minimum standards of fairness, both 
substantive and procedural”.6 
Often, substantive conceptions of the rule of law are also portrayed 
as intimately connected to justice, such that adherence to the rule of law 
guarantees the “goodness” of the legal system as a whole and of all 
individual laws which comprise it.7 It is impossible to separate conceptions 
of the rule of law from underlying philosophical commitments regarding 
 
3 M. Kramer, "Elements of the Rule of Law" in M. Kramer, Objectivity and the Rule of Law, 
(Cambridge 2007), 101–86. 
4 Ibid., at p 468. For an example of a 'substantive' conception, see T.R.S. Allan, "Dworkin 
and Dicey: The Rule of Law as Integrity" (1988) 8 O.J.L.S. 266; T.R.S. Allan, Constitutional 
Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford 2001). 
5 See e.g. Evans v Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21 at [52]; R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal [2011] 
UKSC 28; R (Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] UKHL 45; Walumba Lumba v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 12. See also Young, "Rule of Law", 
pp. 262–63; T.R.S. Allan, "Law, Democracy, and Constitutionalism: Reflections on Evans 
v Attorney General" (2016) 75 C.L.J. 38. 
6 R v Secretary of State ex parte Pierson [1998] AC 539, 591. 
7 R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Oxford 1986), 11–12. 




the relationship between law and morality. As Craig notes, it is 
unsurprising that proponents of formal conceptions of the rule of law tend 
to also embrace a legal positivist conception of legality and that proponents 
of substantive conceptions tend to embrace anti-positivism.8 Nevertheless, 
it seems that there is some space between conceptions of the rule of law 
which are completely neutral regarding the content of law and the 
protection of certain fundamental rights and those which fully collapse 
legality into a particular conception of justice. The arguments advanced in 
this paper seek to problematise the neat distinction between formal and 
substantive conceptions of the rule of law: once we move beyond an 
impoverished conception which sees the rule of law as simply the faithful 
application of the commands of a political ruler,9 we inevitably embrace an 
ideal which speaks to the content of law and requires the protection of 
certain fundamental rights, even if it does not guarantee the substantive 
justice of each and every law.  
The paradigmatic example of a formal conception of the rule of law 
is that of Lon Fuller.10 Fuller argued that legal systems, if they are to be truly 
classed as such, must generally contain laws which are (i) general, (ii) open, 
(iii) prospective, (iv) sufficiently clear, (v) non-contradictory, (vi) stable, 
(vii) capable of being obeyed, and, further, (viii) there must be congruence 
between laws as enacted and as applied.11 Conformity with these eight 
desiderata ensures that governance occurs in accordance with law as 
opposed to the arbitrary will of some tyrannical political ruler and 
generates what Fuller referred to as the “internal morality of law”.12 While 
Fuller referred to these desiderata as constitutive of this inner morality of 
law and integral to the concept of law, later theorists have recast these 
requirements as pertaining to the “rule of law”, an ideal which may or may 
 
8 Craig, "Formal and Substantive Conceptions", p. 477. 
9 See, for example, Allan’s construction of a formal theory to contrast his own; T.R.S. Allan, 
"The Rule of Law" in D. Dyzenhaus and M. Thornburn (eds.), Philosophical Foundations 
of Constitutional Law, (Oxford 2016), 201, 202–3. Here he argues that a formal theory of 
the rule of law, informed by a “simple, majoritarian conception of democracy” would 
mean that law could have any content, so long as the pertinent rules are consistently and 
faithfully applied.  
10 L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, Revised ed. (New Haven 1969).  
11 Ibid., at ch. 2. 
12 Ibid., at pp. 4, 42–43.  





not be necessary for legal validity. This paper will focus primarily on 
Fuller’s conception to show that even these apparently rather thin, formal 
conceptions of the rule of law contain elements which have traditionally 
been associated with a substantive account.  
While Fuller saw the rule of law as an internal morality, 
substantiating a connection between law and justice, his explanation of how 
this obtained was often vague. In particular, he failed to clearly explain how 
adherence to the rule of law might affect the content of legal rules, a failure 
which led Hart to conclude that Fuller offered no “cogent argument in 
support of his claim that these principles are not neutral as between good 
and evil substantive aims”.13 This paper seeks to provide such an argument  
by showing how fidelity to the rule of law has significant implications for 
the kinds of ends which might be pursued through law, even as it might 
not guarantee that all laws are substantively just. Furthermore, one must 
have some conception of the ends which might be pursued through law in 
order to determine what the appropriate means are for achieving those ends 
and what legal forms are best suited to do so.14 In this sense, form and 
substance, and means and ends are intimately connected to one another and 
are in many ways mutually transformative.15 Fuller’s theory of the inner 
morality of law must be read in light of this conclusion.  
  Throughout this paper the precise nature of the “content” and 
“form” of law will be elucidated. The claim that formal theories such as 
Fuller’s do not speak to the content of law will be challenged. Once it has 
been shown that Fuller’s desiderata (and, indeed, any conception of the rule 
of law which places some limitations on the use of political power) does, in 
fact, speak to the content of law, I will then move on to examine the rights 
that are entailed by fidelity to these (allegedly) “formal” accounts. If the rule 
of law entails respect for fundamental rights, then those rights must amount 
to legal ends which contribute to the content of law in some capacity. This 
being the case, the rule of law, by focusing on both legal means and legal 
ends, cannot be easily described as formal or substantive.  
 
13 H.L A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford 1983), 351. 
14 L. Fuller, "Means and Ends" in K. Winston (ed.), The Principles of Social Order: Selected 
Essays of Lon L Fuller, (Oxford 2001). 
15 K. Rundle, "Gardner on Fuller: A Response to 'The Supposed Formality of the Rule of 
Law'" (2015) 6 Jurisprudence 580, 582. 




 In his most recent book, John Gardner also challenges the supposed 
formality of the rule of law by relying on exactly these arguments 
concerning legal content and legal rights. This paper develops those claims, 
arguing that they create significant problems for Gardner’s own account of 
the rule of law as “modal” - defined by legal means and not legal ends. The 
requirements of the rule of law are not means to an end; they serve to limit 
the range of ends which can legitimately be pursued by a lawmaker, 
restricting far more than they facilitate. I also suggest that Kristen Rundle, 
in her critique of Gardner, fails to appreciate the value that his contributions 
might have for those of us who wish to defend a moral conception of 
legality.  
 
II. THREE KEY DISTINCTIONS 
 
Since the seminal writings of A. V. Dicey, the rule of law has played an 
important role at the centre of the British constitution.16 To Dicey, the rule 
of law entails “the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as 
opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, and excludes the existence of 
arbitrariness, of prerogative, or even of wide discretionary authority on the 
part of the government”.17 At a minimum, this concept consists in the 
impartial enforcement of legal rules such that equal subjection of all to law 
obtains.18 As Allan notes, “arbitrary conduct by powerful persons or 
groups, unconstrained by rules, represents the antithesis of law”.19 Indeed, 
this formed a core aspect of Dicey’s conception -- that no man is above the 
law, and “every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the 
ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary 
tribunals”.20 It may be the case that certain classes of persons (for example, 
soldiers) are subject to legal duties that ordinary citizens are not and, as 
 
16 A.V. Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, ed. by John Allison, 
(Oxford 2013). 
17 Ibid., at p. 119. 
18 Ibid. 
19 T.R.S. Allan, The Sovereignty of Law: Freedom, Constitution, and Common Law (Oxford 2013), 
90. See also T. Bingham, The Rule of Law (London 2010), 8: "The core of the existing 
principle is … that all persons and authorities within the state, whether public or private, 
should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly made". 
20 Dicey, Law of the Constitution, p. 100. 





such, may be said to be subject to different laws. However, Dicey quite 
rightly stressed that this is not inconsistent with the rule of law so long as 
those persons, or any other legal officials, are not exempted from the 
application of ordinary law or the legal duties which are entailed by it.21 No 
man may be above the law in the sense that all must follow it. However, 
Dicey seems to have envisaged an additional requirement, one which 
prevented the existence of legally enshrined exemptions to law for legal or 
political rulers.   
The rule of law has never simply required the consistent application 
of whatever commands a political ruler happens to make. These commands 
must be in some sense legal and there must be some standard by which legal 
pronouncements can be distinguished from illegal or non-legal 
pronouncements, even if they come from a duly recognised political 
authority. What is more, the rule of law appears to demand a conceptual 
distinction between a mere political or governmental system and a legal 
system.22 Beyond this, however, significant disagreement abounds 
concerning the precise requirements of the rule of law as well as their 
character as formal or substantive in nature. There are three key distinctions 
which could delineate formal from substantive conceptions of the rule of 
law:  
(i) Formal conceptions do not affect the content of law while 
substantive conceptions do;  
(ii) Formal conceptions do not entail respect for certain rights of 
legal subjects while substantive conceptions do;  
(iii) Formal conceptions do not equate legality with justice while 
substantive conceptions do.   
This paper argues that, once one moves beyond a conception of the rule of 
law as simply requiring the faithful and consistent application of the 
commands of a political ruler, these first two distinctions collapse inwards. 
The only salient distinction that exists between differing conceptions of the 
 
21 Ibid. See also M v Home Office [1994] 1 AC 377, 395. 
22 For example, Kramer argues that Fuller’s conception of the rule of law sets out the 
existence conditions of a legal system such that a political system which does not adhere 
to these requirements to some degree cannot be classed as a legal one. Kramer, "Elements 
of the Rule of Law", pp. 103-109. 




rule of law are those which envisage fidelity to the rule of law as 
guaranteeing the substantive justice of law, on the one hand, and those 
which, on the other hand, see the rule of law as entailing some commitment 
to basic requirements of justice and fairness while nevertheless leaving 
conceptual room for unjust laws which must be critiqued from an external 
standpoint. Ultimately, fidelity to the rule of law entails fidelity to “a corpus 
of basic principles and values, which together lend some stability and 
coherence to the legal order”, even if adherence does not guarantee that 
every legal rule is a just one.23 Once these standards are incorporated into 
the rule of law, a neat distinction between formal and substantive 
conceptions becomes elusive.  
 
III. LEGAL FORM AND LEGAL CONTENT 
 
The first, and perhaps most common, distinction between formal and 
substantive conceptions of the rule of law pertains to the effect that 
conformity with the rule of law has on the content of legal rules. Craig 
argues that formal conceptions of the rule of law do not address “the actual 
content of the law itself”.24 Raz similarly argues that “rule of law principles 
are not about the content of the law, but about its mode of generation and 
application”.25 Kramer sees the rule of law as a “divided phenomenon”, 
representing both content-independent existence conditions of a legal 
system and a political ideal that is to be aspired to should the legal ends 
pursued by that legal system be benign.26 Both Raz and Kramer utilise or 
 
23 T.R.S. Allan, Law, Liberty, and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism 
(Oxford 1993), 21. Note that Allan himself does argue that true legal rules are, in fact, true 
moral rules. See; T.R.S. Allan, "Principle, Practice, and Precedent: Vindicating Justice, 
According to Law" (2018) 77 C.L.J. 269. At one stage in his career, Dworkin likely also 
thought this; Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, pp. 9–32. However, the Dworkin of Law’s 
Empire distinguished between law (integrity) and justice, envisaging a potential for 
conflict between them; R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Harvard University Press, 1986), chs. 
6, 7.  
24 Craig, "Formal and Substantive Conceptions", p. 467. 
25 J. Raz, "The Law’s Own Virtue" (2019) 39 O.J.L.S. 1, 2. See also J. Raz, "The Rule of Law 
and its Virtue" in J. Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, (Oxford 2009), 
210. 
26 Kramer, "Elements of the Rule of Law", pp. 101–2, 142–44. 





build upon Fuller’s theory, and so the proceeding analysis will primarily 
focus on his eight desiderata.27  
 What exactly does it mean to say that some theories of the rule of law 
do not address legal content? Specifically, how can legal content be 
distinguished from legal form? One starting point is to note that the form 
of something is naturally contrasted with its content. To use Gardner’s 
example, “the content of a book is one thing (jokes, short stories, etc) and its 
form (hardback, e-book, etc) is another”.28 This seems intuitively plausible. 
However, an initial cause for concern arises when one notes that this 
approach begins with the presumption that form and substance are neatly 
separable and conceptually distinct -- one defined in opposition to the 
other. Indeed, this also presumes that our understanding of legal form and 
legal content can fit neatly with our understanding of form and substance 
in other contexts. Such an approach may cut off by definitional fiat any 
interpretation of legal form and legal content which sees them as mutually 
constitutive. 
 Nevertheless, if we begin by presuming that legal form and legal 
content can be easily contrasted, we immediately run into a broader, more 
foundational issue: on this definition, almost nothing in traditionally formal 
theories can be properly described as formal. Gardner makes this point with 
regard to Fuller’s conception:  
 
True, a law that goes unpromulgated (ie that is kept secret) need not 
have different content from its open counterpart. All else being 
equal, however, a law that it is impossible for people to obey needs 
to have its content changed if it is to become possible for people to 
obey it. Likewise, all else being equal, at least one of two mutually 
inconsistent laws needs to have its content changed if they are to be 
rendered consistent with each other. What is more, a retrospective 
law that regulates ing necessarily has different content from its 
 
27 Waldron also notes that Fuller’s conception “does not directly require anything 
substantive”, and argues that these requirements, far from being procedural are better 
described as formal and structural in character. J. Waldron, "The Concept and the Rule of 
Law" (2008) 29 Sibley Lecture Series at 7. See also J. Waldron, "The Rule of Law", in E.N. 
Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2016). 
28 Gardner, "Supposed Formality", p. 199. 




prospective counterpart, in that it regulates ing in the past as well 
as ing in the future. Stability and generality in a law are also none 
other than stability and generality in that law’s content; ie in what is 
regulated by it and what is not. A more general law regulating ing 
is one that regulates more cases of ing than its less general 
counterpart. A more stable law regulating ing is one that varies less 
over time, in respect of which cases of ing it regulates, than does its 
less stable counterpart. All of these Fullerian desiderata pass 
judgment on the content of the law, and indeed on nothing else.29 
 
While Gardner is correct in this assessment, his analysis needs significant 
qualification. In order for some of these desiderata to speak to the content 
and not the form of law, one must first distinguish between a particular law 
and the norm which it expresses. Often when we speak of the form of a 
specific law, we are not actually referencing the form of the law itself (its 
expression through legislation, caselaw etc.). Rather, we are referring to the 
form of the norm that is contained within that law.  
The use of the term “law” here is admittedly quite ambiguous. For 
this paper, it is useful to distinguish between the following: (a) “law” as in 
a legal system; (b) “laws” as in the individual statutes or common law rules 
that exist within a legal system; and (c) the “laws of a case” as in the 
particularised propositions of law that decide individual cases by reference 
to the general laws which comprise a legal system.30 When describing the 
form of law, Gardner seems to be focusing on the second of these meanings 
-- the individual laws that exist within a legal system. Often, commentators 
referencing the formality of the rule of law seem to be referencing 
something else entirely, focusing more on the form of legal norms which are 
contained within those statutes or common law principles.31  
Thus, if we rely on a distinction between “laws” and “legal norms” 
when we look to legislation that retroactively prohibits the wearing of face 
coverings, we could say that the form of the law is legislative in nature, 
 
29 Ibid. 
30 See H.L.A. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morality" (1958) 71 Harv. L. 
Rev. 593, 600–601; M.S. Moore, "Law as a Functional Kind" in R.P. George (ed.), Natural 
Law Theory, (Oxford 1992), 193.  
31 Waldron, "The Concept and the Rule of Law", 7–8; Waldron, "The Rule of Law". 





while the legal norm contained within or derived from this law has its own 
form and substantive content. The substantive content of the norm in 
question could amount to the prohibition on the wearing of face coverings 
whereas its form would, in part, speak to its temporal dimension. 
Nevertheless, it is crucial to recognise that the content of a law contains both 
the substance and the form of a particular norm; it includes a legal norm in 
its entirety. As such, while Gardner is correct when he says that the rule of 
law “has no general guidance to give regarding law’s form”, it does seem 
to have some guidance to give regarding the form of the norms that form 
the content of particular laws.32  
At this point it may be possible to reformulate this claim to 
distinguish between theories of the rule of law which place limitations 
solely on the form of legal norms and those which place limitations on the 
content of these norms. This new formulation would necessarily accept that 
the rule of law, even on a “formal” conception, affects legal content. 
However, a conceptual distinction might remain which would allow for the 
categorisation of certain theories into the formal camp and others into the 
substantive camp. On this reading, formal theories of the rule of law do not 
affect the substance of legal norms, only their form. To use the example 
above, they might have something to say regarding the temporal dimension 
of a particular legal norm, or the scope of the norm, but nothing to say about 
the prohibition of face coverings, or the substance of any other legal norm. 
As such, we might reformulate Craig’s initial claim to the following: formal 
theories of the rule of law do not address the actual substance of legal 
norms, even if they affect the form of those norms and thus affect the 
content of law.  
 While this reformulation is a better representation of an allegedly 
“formal” conception of the rule of law, it concedes that formal conceptions 
are not actually content-neutral and, crucially, it does not apply to Fuller’s 
theory. His desiderata do in fact affect the content of legal norms. To draw 
out this point, consider the requirement that laws must be capable of being 
 
32 Gardner, "Supposed Formality", p. 201. It seems that Rundle, in her response to Gardner 
has failed to account for this, even though she argues that the rule of law “does have 
guidance to give about the qualities of the state of affairs that must be brought into being 
if the relevant arrangement is to properly be regarded as a ‘legal’ one”. Rundle, "Gardner 
on Fuller", p. 581. 




obeyed. If an enactment were to violate this criterion, we might have an 
issue with either the form of the norm, the content of the norm, or both the 
form and the content of the norm. An obvious example of a breach which 
can only be rectified by changing the content of a legal norm would be a 
requirement that people grow wings and fly to a designated place five years 
prior to the enactment of this statute. As absurd as this law might be, we 
can clearly see that this falls foul of the rule of law due to both the form and 
the content of the legal norm in question. On the one hand, the form of the 
norm is implicated because the temporal dimension of the norm makes it 
impossible to be obeyed. On the other hand, the content of the norm is 
implicated because it requires people to do something that they cannot 
possibly do.  
Another example of Fuller’s desiderata affecting the substantive 
content of legal norms is the requirement of non-contradiction. If two laws 
were enacted, one containing a norm which mandated the wearing of face 
coverings, while the other contained a norm which prohibited the wearing 
of face coverings, the only way to resolve such a conflict would be to 
change the content of one of those norms. Whether these desiderata speak 
to the content of the norm or to its form will depend on the context. What 
is certain however, is that these criteria will place limitations on the content 
of legal norms in some contexts. As such, we cannot say that Fuller’s 
conception of the rule of law only manifests restrictions on the form of 
legal norms. His theory -- the prime example of a formal understanding of 
the rule of law -- affects both the content of law and, more narrowly, the 
content of the norms expressed through law.  
In this sense, Fuller’s theory is far more “substantive” than he seems 
to have recognised. It is one thing to say, as Rundle does, that Fuller’s 
theory focuses on the form of law but, due to the mutually transformative 
nature of means and ends, that this has implications for legal content; it is 
another thing entirely to say that this theory doesn’t say much about form 
at all and in fact focuses far more on legal content than we have hitherto 
recognised.33 In particular, Rundle challenges the lack of nuance within 
most positivist descriptions of Fuller’s theory, emphasising that the 
formality (as well as the modality) of law has implications for the content 
 
33 Rundle, "Gardner on Fuller", pp. 582–83. 





of law and, consequently, that “Forms Liberate”.34 As such, her criticism of 
Gardner is focused on his failure to account for the transformative nature 
of legal form and his reliance on an instrumentalist conception of the rule 
of law. These criticisms ring true. However, there is more to be said in 
favour of Gardner’s analysis than Rundle gives him credit for: the claim 
that the rule of law is not in fact content-independent has significant 
implications for any description of Fuller’s theory as “formal”, or 
“procedural”, or even, as we will explore below, “modal”. In particular, if 
we accept that the rule of law focuses far more on legal content than it does 
on legal form, we must concede that Fuller may have misdescribed his 
own theory and that attempting to reclaim Fuller on Fuller’s own terms (as 
Rundle does) may hamper the development of a theory which builds upon 
and develops beyond the foundations that he lay down.  
In addition to Fuller’s, other allegedly “formal” conceptions of the 
rule of law appear, on closer inspection, to affect the content of law as well. 
For example, Dicey’s conception precludes legally enshrined exemptions 
for legal officials and consequently requires generality in aim. Laws must 
be impersonal, applied only to general classes of persons, and contain no 
proper names, - in contrast with blatant arbitrariness or caprice.35 On this 
conception, lawmakers are prohibited from enacting a law, the substantive 
content of which specifically targets an identified individual or which 
places legal or political rulers outside the reach of legality.36 Further, it 
would not be open to lawmakers to enact legislation which granted 
unlimited discretionary powers to government officials or which placed 
their decisions outside the bounds of judicial review.37 Crucially, the issue 
here would be with the content of such laws, not their form or the 
procedure by which they came to be enacted.  
 
34 Rundle, Forms Liberate, pp. 8-10, 193-196. 
35 See G. Marshall, Constitutional Theory (Oxford 1971), 136–37; Allan, Constitutional Justice, 
pp. 122–23. Note, however, that Fuller would not consider these requirements to be 
contained within his generality desideratum; to him, these belonged within the realm of 
external morality and the doctrine of fairness, not the more foundational requirement that 
there be a system of general rules. See Fuller, Morality of Law, p. 47. 
36 See Allan, The Sovereignty of Law, pp. 93–94, 140–41. 
37 See Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147; R (Cart) v Upper 
Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28, at [89]; R (Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal 
[2019] UKSC 22, at [107]-[112], [160]-[165]. See also Raz, "The Rule of Law and its Virtue", 
p. 217. 




Lawmakers, acting with fidelity to the rule of law, are evidently 
constrained in terms of the content of their enactments, even if this 
constraint is voluntary such that a principle of parliamentary sovereignty 
might take precedence over the rule of law in some circumstances.38 
However, this seems unlikely to occur within the contemporary UK 
context. As Lord Hope observed in Jackson, “Parliamentary Sovereignty is 
no longer, if it ever was, absolute”.39 Importantly, the reason for this is that 
the “rule of law enforced by the courts is the ultimate controlling factor on 
which our constitution is based”.40  
Thus, if the hallmark of a substantive conception of the rule of law 
is that it affects the content of law, then we must conclude that both Fuller 
and Dicey expounded substantive conceptions. Indeed, it would be 
difficult to find any theory of the rule of law that did not affect legal 
content in some manner. Even Hayek’s account, summarised as the 
requirement that “government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and 
announced beforehand”, would necessarily preclude the existence of laws 
with content that delegated unlimited authority to a particular 
government minister to disregard previously announced rules.41 Even as 
thin an account as this must necessarily speak to legal content if it is to 
distinguish legality from brute political force. 
 
 
IV. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS  
Substantive theories of the rule of law are portrayed as unique in their 
recognition of the existence of certain rights. These rights are said to be 
derived from the values which underpin the rule of law. According to this 
analysis, once one has accepted the existence of these rights, one can then 
distinguish between “good” laws, which respect these rights, and “bad” 
 
38 That is, if the rule of law and parliamentary sovereignty can even feasibly come into 
conflict. See T.R.S. Allan, "Questions of legality and legitimacy: Form and substance in 
British constitutionalism" (2011) 9 I.CON 155; T.R.S. Allan, "Constitutional Dialogue and 
the Justification of Judicial Review" (2003) 23 O.J.L.S. 563; T.R.S. Allan, "The 
Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review: Conceptual Conundrum or Interpretative 
Inquiry" (2002) C.L.J. 87. Cf. P. Craig, "Constitutional Foundations, the Rule of Law and 
Supremacy" (2003) P.L. 92. 
39 R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 54, at [104].  
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laws, which do not.42 We have already seen how the rule of law speaks to 
legal content; we will now explore how it also mandates that certain 
fundamental rights form a necessary part of the content of law in some 
capacity and consequently how those rights limit the kinds of ends which 
might legitimately be pursued within a legal system.  
The above dichotomy is premised on the presumption that 
supposedly “formal” theories such as Fuller’s or Dicey’s do not imply or 
entail the protection of fundamental rights. This assessment seems 
intuitively plausible. It is certainly true that the desiderata that Fuller sets 
out are not framed as rights that legal subjects might have. They are 
presented as requirements that lawmakers must conform to if they wish to 
establish a legal system and as virtues that a legal system must aspire to in 
order to achieve some degree of excellence in legality.43 This being the case, 
it would be impossible for a legal system to live up to this ideal without 
establishing some protections for citizens against exactly the kinds of 
enactments which might threaten the rule of law. As Gardner notes: 
 
Even though there is no right that there be no secret laws, probably 
there is a right, derived from the openness desideratum, not to be 
prosecuted, convicted, or punished under a secret law. And even 
though there is no right that there be no non-general laws, such as 
Bills of Attainder, almost certainly there is a right not to be on the 
receiving end of one.44 
 
This is also true of other “formal” conceptions of the rule of law. Dicey’s 
requirement of generality would entail a legal right not to be subject to a 
Bill of Attainder or to a secret law and may also include a right to challenge 
the legality of one’s detention and to receive the remedy of habeas corpus.45 
 
42 Craig, "Formal and Substantive Conceptions", p. 467. 
43 See Fuller, Morality of Law, p. 168. 
44 Gardner, "The Supposed Formality", p. 204. 
45 Dicey, Law of the Constitution, pp. 111, 125–28, 130–33, 245. See also; Bingham, Rule of Law, 
pp. 13–14. It is worth reiterating that Gardner is wrong to suggest that Fuller conceived 
of the generality requirement as entailing a right against Bills of Attainder. See note 35 
above. However, this does not undermine the general point that many of the other 
desiderata do entail respect for the rights of legal subjects not to be subject to retroactive 
or contradictory laws and so on.  




There also appears to be a number of other rights entailed by some formal 
conceptions of the rule of law including a right of access to courts, a right 
to have adverse administrative decisions subject to judicial review,46 and, 
following Hayek, a right not to be subject to governmental action which is 
not authorised in advance by sufficiently precise and determinate rules.47 
This is not simply a requirement that legislatures must conform to. As Lord 
Hope stressed in Jackson, the judiciary is also under a (legal) duty to adhere 
to the rule of law in its adjudication of legal disputes.48 We must therefore 
conclude that Craig is wrong to say that formal conceptions such as Dicey’s 
do not speak “to the content of the laws which an individual will have to 
face when taken before the courts”.49 If a legal system were to conform to 
the rule of law, specific limitations would be placed on the content of law 
which would entail rights for citizens not to be subject to enactments, 
policies, or administrative decisions which conflicted with the rule of law.  
It is in this sense that these rights are “fundamental”. They are 
fundamental because that they are grounded within the very foundations 
of a system of law.50 A legal system cannot be said to be in conformity with 
the rule of law if breaches of the requirements of the rule of law are not 
precluded by the establishment of fundamental rights. This point is 
reinforced by the fact that, if the rule of law did not guarantee certain 
protections to citizens against the abuse of governmental power, it would 
be of little value and could scarcely be seen as a political ideal at all. This is 
true even if these rights are not absolute and could therefore be legitimately 
infringed in certain contexts. It seems that in order for the rule of law to 
generate any normative force, regardless of whether it is a mere political 
ideal or an aspect of the existence conditions of a legal system, it must 
 
46 See e.g. Raz, "The Rule of Law and its Virtue", pp. 216–18. 
47 Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, p. 54. 
48 R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 54, at [107]. 
49 Craig, "Formal and Substantive Conceptions", p. 470. 
50 Often the term “fundamental rights” evokes a particular list of rights. Some of these 
rights, for example a right to be free from a Bill of Attainder or a right to be subject only 
to published laws, evidently arise from particular conceptions of the rule of law. 
However, others do not appear to be entailed by, for example, Fuller’s theory. This paper 
only references fundamental rights which are entailed by particular conceptions of the 
rule of law, specifically those which have traditionally been described as formal.  





establish some protections. The real issue for our purposes concerns the 
nature of the protections offered.  
Once again, we must accept that a seemingly clear distinction 
between formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law becomes 
elusive. On closer inspection, fidelity to the rule of law evidently does entail 
respect for certain rights of legal subjects. This being said, there might still 
be a conceptual distinction at play here concerning the nature of the rights 
which are entailed by fidelity to the rule of law. It is here where the 
distinction between form and substance re-emerges. Within this context, 
formal rights are more often described as procedural, whereas substantive 
rights seem to have retained that marker even though the connotation of 
substantive has changed quite dramatically.51  
 Gardner, resisting sharp-line distinctions, notes that terms like 
“formal” and “substantive” are notoriously unhelpful: their meaning is 
almost exclusively context-dependent.52 Nevertheless, it may be possible to 
shed some light on this dichotomy. One might assume that a procedural 
right speaks only to legal means: the methods used to reach particular legal 
conclusions or to generate particular legal rules. Indeed, this reading would 
conform with how the term “procedural” is ordinarily used, as well as with 
how it is used when speaking of procedural justice.53 In contrast, 
substantive rights are portrayed as establishing the content of the legal 
conclusion or of the legal rule itself -- legal ends.  
However, once we begin to explore how particular claims might be 
tested within a legal system, it becomes more and more difficult to clearly 
delineate between procedure and substance in this context. Again, insight 
 
51 See Craig, "Formal and Substantive Conceptions", p. 485. Here Craig references 
‘procedure or form as opposed to substance’ which is in line with a recurring trend of 
assuming that form and procedure are synonymous in this context. In contrast, Waldron 
draws a distinction between form and procedure, associating Fuller’s conception with the 
former and Dicey’s conception with the latter while maintaining that both are distinct 
from substantive conceptions; Waldron, "The Concept and the Rule of Law", pp. 7–9. See 
also M. Kramer, "Scrupulousness without Scruples: a Critique of Lon Fuller and his 
Defenders" in M. Kramer, In Defence of Legal Positivism: Law without Trimmings, (Oxford 
1999), 37, 37. 
52 Gardner, "The Supposed Formality", pp. 201–2. 
53 See Kramer, In Defence of Legal Positivism, pp. 21-28; J. Waldron, "The Concept and the 
Rule of Law", pp. 7–9; J. Waldron, "The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure" 
(2011) 50 Nomos 3. 




can be drawn from Gardner’s analysis. He argues that often the substantive 
content of a legal case will be focused entirely on procedural grounds.54 He 
uses the example of a lawsuit brought against the police for unlawful 
imprisonment. Here the substantive content of the case concerns procedural 
impropriety. If the police failed to follow the correct procedures of arrest, 
detention, and questioning of a suspect, then a right has been breached:  
 
the rules governing these police procedures are procedural rules, 
and yet they are also substantive rules relative to certain other 
procedural rules (viz. the ones governing how to sue for false 
imprisonment) … The substantive question for trial, indeed, is 
whether there were procedural violations in other proceedings. So 
the rules (and rights) at issue in the case are simultaneously 
procedural and substantive.55  
 
The conclusion that there is no clear-cut distinction between procedure and 
substance is of crucial importance and is particularly evident when focus 
shifts to analysis of supposedly formal conceptions such as Fuller’s theory. 
While one of his desiderata, the requirement of congruence between legal 
rules as announced and their actual administration, certainly speaks to 
procedures of rule application, it also speaks to substantive questions 
relating to correct interpretation, implying a right to have the law 
interpreted and applied in a manner which respects and maintains the 
integrity of the legal system as a whole. Fuller notes that this congruence 
between a legal rule and its application: 
 
may be destroyed or impaired in a great variety of ways: mistaken 
interpretation, inaccessibility of the law, lack of insight into what is 
required to maintain the integrity of a legal system, bribery, 




54 Gardner, "The Supposed Formality", pp. 201–3. 
55 Ibid., at p. 202. 
56 Fuller, Morality of Law, p. 81. 





While there are certainly procedural elements to this desideratum, Fuller is 
sketching a rich and nuanced account of adjudication which argues subtly 
against any clear distinction between procedure and substance.57 For Fuller, 
adjudication is a form of social ordering which is “institutionally committed 
to a reasoned decision, to a decision based on principle”.58 On this view, 
adjudication is not simply the application of legal standards to particular 
cases: it also embodies a relationship of reciprocity between lawmaker and 
legal subject which “gives formal and institutional expression to the 
influence of reasoned argument in human affairs”.59 Interestingly, Fuller 
also argued that the institutional framework of adjudication tends to 
convert these arguments into claims of right or accusations of fault.60 With 
this in mind, it is easy to see how a conception of adjudication as 
institutionally committed to the enforcement of legal rights might imply 
that the rule of law necessitates respect for the legal subject as a rights-
bearing entity. Indeed, any legislation which attempted, directly or 
indirectly, to erode the right to a fair trial would be in fundamental conflict 
with the rule of law.61 Crucially, such a right does not simply pertain to the 
faithful application of existing legal rules whatever be their content: it 
mandates that particular interpretations of rules (those authorising the 
abrogation of a fair trial) be disregarded as inconsistent with principles of 
legality. Within the U.K., the right to a fair trial is “fundamental and 
absolute”.62 It is difficult to see how respect for these rights does not affect 
the substantive outcomes of particular cases to which they pertain to.    
Furthermore, leaving this aspect of his theory aside, there is not 
much else contained within Fuller’s desiderata that could be described as 
procedural or means-focused. The rest of his criteria do not establish rights 
concerning the procedures of rule application; they focus solely on rights 
 
57 Ibid., at pp. 81–91. 
58 L. Fuller, "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication" in K. Winston (ed.), The Principles of 
Social Order: Selected Essays of Lon L. Fuller, (Oxford 2001), 101, 113–14. 
59 Ibid., at p. 109. 
60 Ibid., at pp. 111–12. 
61 Bingham, Rule of Law, p. 90. This is particularly true within criminal law where it is 
“axiomatic that a person charged with having committed a criminal offence should 
receive a fair trial”; R v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court, ex p Bennett [1994] 1 AC 42, 68 
repeated in Attorney General’s Reference (No. 2 of 2001) [2003] UKHL 68; [2004] 2 AC 72, at 
para. [13]. 
62 Brown v Stott [2003] 1 AC 681, 719.  




pertaining to legal content and the character of the legal system as a whole, 
just as Dicey’s conception entails substantive rights which would dictate the 
conclusion of particular cases. For example, fidelity to his conception of the 
rule of law would lead a court to conclude that a Bill of Attainder lacks legal 
authority or that legal subjects have a right not to be punished or made to 
suffer except by reference to pre-existing legal rules.63 While, at first glance, 
these may appear to be procedural rights, Gardner is correct that they 
evidently take on substantive force once they become operative to guide the 
outcomes of particular cases.  
 Even though Fuller clearly envisaged a deep connection between his 
desiderata and a moral conception of law, his theory did not explicitly 
develop a connection between the inner morality of law and the protection 
of the fundamental rights that Gardner has identified. The notion that 
Fuller’s theory is not straightforwardly a “formal” one is not new. Fuller 
himself and many theorists sympathetic to his analysis have stressed that 
the moral dimensions of his theory complicate this designation.64 This is so 
even if positivists who have taken up his desiderata within their own work 
would seek to eschew such connections.65 Nevertheless, Gardner’s 
observations relating to the implicit connection between fidelity to these 
desiderata and respect for certain fundamental rights have the potential to 
expand upon Fuller’s initial theorisation in ways that Gardner himself may 
not have realised. In particular, if respect for these rights is implicit within 
the rule of law, this has significant implications for Gardner’s own theory 
and his characterisation of the rule of law as modal, to say nothing of the 
implications for positivist jurisprudence in general.  
 It is unclear how Fuller himself would see such a development of his 
theory. Indeed, Rundle is correct to stress that Fuller’s arguments were 
 
63 Dicey, Law of the Constitution, pp. 225–26. See also; Allan, The Sovereignty of Law, pp. 19, 
93–94, 140–41, 185. 
64 See e.g. Rundle, "Gardner on Fuller"; Rundle, Forms Liberate, ch. 2; Simmonds, Law as a 
Moral Idea (Oxford 2008).  
65 See H.L.A. Hart, "Book Review - The Morality of Law" (1965) 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1281; 
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law , 2nd ed., (Oxford 1994), 206–7; Raz, "The Rule of Law and 
its Virtue", p. 224; J. Raz, "Formalism and the Rule of Law" in R. P. George (ed.), Natural 
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focused primarily (at least as he presented them) on form, not substance.66 
Nevertheless, one could expand beyond Fuller and Rundle and embrace an 
account of the rule of law which emphasises necessary connections between 
the existence of a legal system and the existence of fundamental rights held 
by legal subjects. This is significant, particularly when one recalls that 
Fuller’s desiderata are commonly recognised as the bare minimum 
conditions for the existence of a legal system. It is one thing to have a rights-
based account of “thick”, “substantive” conceptions of the rule of law; it is 
another thing entirely to recognise that even the most impoverished, thin 
account of the rule of law implies respect for fundamental rights. If this is 
so, then the very concept of a legal subject becomes rights-laden: to be a 
legal subject is to be a rights-bearing entity.  
 
V. MEANS, ENDS, AND MODALITY 
While this paper has offered some challenges to characterisations of the rule 
of law as formal or procedural, there may be some distinction that could be 
used to differentiate theories like Fuller’s or Dicey’s from theories which are 
similar to that of Ronald Dworkin or T.R.S. Allan.67 This appears to be the 
driving force behind Gardner’s conclusion that the rule of law is not formal 
but modal, in that it is distinguished by its means and not its ends.68 Here, 
modality is defined by a focus on the means by which law is created or 
applied. Functional theories, in contrast, are defined by a focus on the 
attainment of specific legal ends. Indeed, Fuller often refers to the inner 
morality of law as procedural or institutional, indicating that he may agree 
with Gardner’s assessment of the rule of law as modal in that it is defined 
by its means and not its ends.  
However, such a reading of Fuller would present an impoverished 
account of his writing on this topic. In fact, Fuller was adamant in his 
 
66 Rundle, "Gardner on Fuller", p. 582. 
67 See R. Dworkin, A matter of principle (Oxford 1986); T.R.S. Allan, "The rule of law as the 
rule of reason: consent and constitutionalism" (1999) 115 L.Q.R 221; Allan, Constitutional 
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conviction to problematise the means-ends distinction.69 To him, legal ends 
are constituted always by reference to legal means and vice versa. To 
explain this, he offers the analogy of architecture. Architecture, according 
to Fuller, is “not an abstract science but a practical art".70 By this he means 
that it exists for the satisfaction of certain human ends, namely beauty and 
utility. The means of achieving these ends are materials such as cement, 
lumber and steel, as well as the skill necessary to assemble them into the 
product desired. Fuller quite rightly emphasises that these means are in 
many ways subservient to the ends of utility and beauty. Thus, it could be 
argued that one can only begin to define architecture once there is a clear 
understanding of the ends of architecture: “the study of architecture must 
begin with ends, with a definition of utility and beauty, for it is only when 
these ends have been clarified that it is possible to deal intelligently with 
means, or even to know what means are relevant to the objects of 
architecture”.71  
This does not mean that there must be a primacy of ends over means 
-- that architectural means take their entire character from the ends to which 
they are subservient. Fuller stresses that the relationship between means 
and ends is not “a one-way affair”,72 noting that “[i]n all areas, from the 
most trivial to the most exalted, the mind is compelled to sharpen its 
judgement by narrowing its range. Some limitation of means, imposed by 
circumstances or voluntarily accepted, is essential for an intelligent 
definition of the ends sought”.73 Thus, once we have a goal in mind, it is 
imperative to first account for the means available to us to achieve that goal. 
Conversely, Fuller argued that one cannot resolve problems associated with 
an instrumentalist conception of law simply by adopting the polar opposite 
position of focusing exclusively on means and ignoring ends. For Fuller, 
some cursory conception of ends is necessary to define the range of means 
which are worthy of consideration for achieving those ends.74  
 
69 See L. Fuller, "American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century: A Review of Edwin W 
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70 Fuller, "Means and Ends", p. 64. 
71 Ibid., at p. 64. 
72 Ibid., at p. 65. 
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Gardner’s modal/functional distinction presumes that formal 
theories of the rule of law are distinguished by legal means and not legal 
ends. However, if we recognise the point made by Gardner himself that the 
rights entailed by fidelity to the rule of law are often both means-focused 
and ends-focused, then we must conclude that the rule of law is never 
distinguished solely by a focus on either means or ends. Many aspects of 
Fuller’s or Dicey’s theories are unobtainable without their entailed rights 
becoming legal ends in some capacity, whether in the form of legislation or 
adjudication, or, more broadly, the foundational principles of the common 
law. The rights Gardner identifies as entailed by the rule of law must be 
legal rights, contained within the content of law if they are to have legal 
force. A right not to be subject to a Bill of Attainder is a substantive right -- 
a legal end in-and-of-itself, even if it might also be categorised as a means 
of achieving some other end.  
Even the most “substantive” theories of the rule of law always look 
to both legal means and legal ends, informed by concerns for procedural 
justice, correct interpretation, and faithful application of law as much as 
they stress the protection of rights to freedom of speech, habeas corpus, or 
freedom of assembly.75 Indeed, many of the rights entailed by fidelity to the 
rule of law cannot be neatly classified as modal or functional, means-
focused or ends-focused. They are simultaneously modal and functional. 
As Rundle notes, Fuller’s theory focuses on how legal means and legal ends 
are mutually transformative.76  
Gardner offers greater nuance to the means/ends distinction but 
continues to uphold it through the introduction of an intervening argument 
which is premised on a characterisation of the fundamental rights entailed 
by fidelity to the rule of law as subsidiary ends of law.77 Gardner did not 
premise the modality of law on some crude opposition between means and 
ends: he does not see the requirements of the rule of law as means to an end 
in their entirety. Rather, being subsidiary ends, they do a significant amount 
of “end work” even as they act as means to some further, ultimate end.78 To 
him, they are primarily instrumental, pursued “with an eye to whether 
 
75 See e.g. Allan, Constitutional Justice.  
76 Rundle, "Gardner on Fuller", p. 583; Rundle, Forms Liberate, chs. 2, 3. 
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[they] will help us to reach the further ends to which [they are] 
subsidiary”.79 Fuller never explicitly identified any connection between 
fidelity to law and respect for fundamental rights. Nevertheless, he firmly 
rejected an instrumentalist conception of law.80 Fidelity to the rule of law 
ensures that a legal system cannot act as if ends justify means or vice versa; 
legal ends are always constituted in part by the means used to achieve those 
ends and legal means are intelligible only when we have some conception 
of what ends they are to be put to. Indeed, this is the central thrust of 
Rundle’s response to Gardner: he has failed to account for how the rule of 
law renders legal means and legal ends mutually transformative and 
consequently relies too heavily on an instrumentalist conception of law.81 
However, there is a much more foundational problem with 
Gardner’s description of the requirements of the rule of law as means to an 
end: many of the requirements of the rule of law cannot reasonably be seen 
as means of achieving further ends at all. While we might describe rights of 
access to courts or to have laws applied according to their terms as means 
of achieving certain yet to be defined ends, other desiderata can be seen 
only as ends in-and-of themselves and operate specifically to limit the range 
of possibilities open to a lawmaker. They are means only of protecting the 
rights which are entailed by them, if they can be seen as means at all. These 
aspects of the rule of law operate to limit the use of political power: to 
prevent the existence of Bills of Attainder, of unjustified retrospective laws, 
and of other legal ends which come into conflict with the rule of law such 
as the attempt to exempt legal or political rulers from legal obligation or to 
place administrative decisions beyond the reach of judicial review. Kramer 
is therefore mistaken to suggest that “[w]hether … the objectives pursued 
by officials are products of moral concern or of exploitative selfishness, the 
officials can most effectively achieve their ends through the operations of a 
legal system”.82 Some ends are most definitely incompatible with the rule of 
 
79 Ibid., at p. 208. 
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law and, consequently, conformity with the rule of law cannot be the most 
effective means of pursuing those ends.  
The requirement of non-contradiction is not a means of achieving 
any specific legal end other than the protection of a right not to be subject 
to contradictory legal rules. Even then, it seems odd to conceive of this 
requirement as a means of achieving this end; it is better seen as a limitation 
which implies and entails a legal right rather than a method of achieving 
any particular goal. The requirement of prospectivity is a restriction on the 
ends which can legitimately be pursued within a legal system; it prevents a 
lawmaker from pursuing the end of punishing legal subjects for conduct 
which was not illegal at the time of action. This desideratum is a means to 
an end only insofar as it sets out the threshold condition for recognition of 
a legitimate end of law; it is a “means” in the same way that a requirement 
of consideration is a “means” of creating a contract - that is, it is not a means 
at all. Consideration itself may be necessary for the creation of a contract 
and, as such, its attainment could be seen as a means of doing so. However, 
the requirement of consideration as a constitutive element of a valid contract 
is not a means of creating a contract: it is a categorical limitation which 
places certain kinds of agreements outside of the class of valid contracts.  
Many of the desiderata of the rule of law and the fundamental rights 
which are entailed by them operate in much the same way through the 
removal of certain legal ends from the category of rule of law compliant 
laws. Law may be a means to an end, but the requirements of legality are 
not. If the requirement of prospectivity is pursued with an eye to some 
further end, that end is constituted in part by reference to this requirement. 
This is not a means to an end: it is a foundational aspect of the end itself. A 
lawmaker attempting to prohibit and punish the wearing of face coverings 
in the future and one attempting to prohibit and punish the wearing of face 
coverings in both the past and the future are seeking to achieve two 
different ends, one of which is compliant with the rule of law and the other 
is not.83 Indeed, this is a point made by Gardner himself when arguing that 
 
83 It is important to reiterate that retrospective laws may conform to the rule of law in very 
exceptional circumstances as a remedy for previous breaches of the inner morality of law. 
See Fuller, Morality of Law, pp. 53–54. I suggest that compliance in this context should not 
be read to mean simply numerical frequency but to focus on how particular laws respect 




retrospective laws necessarily have different content from their prospective 
counterparts.84 If they have different content, they also pursue different 
legal ends. 
The requirement of prospectivity, through the pre-emptive 
preclusion of certain objectives from the class of legitimate ends which can 
be achieved through law, is an example of the form of a legal norm limiting 
and defining the end that is to be pursued in much the same way that the 
tools of architecture limit and define the products that can be produced. 
Gardner argues that “to say that law is a modal as opposed to functional 
kind is merely to say that law is not distinguished by its functions—by the 
purposes it is capable of serving. It is distinguished rather by the distinctive 
means that it provides for serving whatever ends it serves”.85 However, the 
rule of law clearly does speak to the purposes that it will allow law to be 
put to. It will not recognize ends such as the retroactive or particularized 
punishment of legal subjects as legitimate ends of law. The requirements of 
prospectively and generality serve to cut those ends off at the pass. No 
matter how much a lawmaker wished to intimidate a political rival through 
the creation of a law which targeted them by name, that end is not one 
which would be permissible within a rule of law compliant legal system. It 
seems, following on from the above, that we can conclude that the rule of 
law is not distinguished by the means that it provides for serving whatever 
ends may be desired. Rather, most rule of law principles focus on limiting 
the range of possible ends that might be open to a lawmaker or 
governmental official. In light of this conclusion, the following claim 
advanced by Gardner simply cannot be correct: 
 
If law were a functional kind, distinguished by the purposes it is 
capable of serving, then the list of desiderata for law’s internal 
morality would also naturally pass judgment on law’s ends. But law 
is not a functional kind, and the evaluation of its ends is therefore 
 
the status of the legal subject as a rights-bearing moral agent, what Fuller would describe 
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left to ordinary, unspecialized, external morality, the same morality 
that binds us all.86 
 
The rule of law evidently does pass judgement on legal ends. Fidelity to the 
rule of law might not necessarily guarantee the substantive justice of those 
ends, but it would be wrong to conclude that a rule of law compliant legal 
system could pursue any ends at all.87 Indeed, Fuller recognised that the 
internal morality of law “affects and limits the substantive aims that can be 
achieved through law”.88 Formal theories are indeed distinguished, at least 
in part, by the purposes they render a legal system capable of serving. Thus, 
while compliance with the rule of law may ostensibly lead to the efficient 
attainment of a wide variety of legal ends, Fuller rightly stressed this does 
not mean that “any substantive aim might be adopted without compromise 
of legality”.89  
 
 VI. FUNCTIONALISM AND MODALITY 
Does the above analysis lead us to the conclusion that the rule of law is, in 
fact, of a functional kind? For the rule of law to be functional, it must do 
more than simply affect, limit, or stipulate legal ends; it must also identify 
the overarching purpose of law. Functionalist jurisprudence concerns itself 
with identifying the functions that legal systems serve, usually with an eye 
to assessing the connection that may exist between those functions and 
some conception of morality or justice.90 Functionalist jurisprudence 
attempts to define the concept of a legal system by reference to its function 
or purpose as opposed to its structures.91 Was Fuller a functionalist? Early 
in his career he likened a legal system to a steam-engine in that both were 
functional kinds. This meant that, for Fuller, one could not clearly delineate 
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between questions seeking to determine if X was a steam engine and those 
seeking to determine if X was a good steam engine, as to be a steam engine 
at all is to perform the function of steam-engines to some degree.92 
Furthermore, Fuller regularly stated that the function of a legal system was 
to subject human conduct to the governance of general rules.93 If his 
argument was that the function of law is to guide human conduct through 
the use of general rules and that it was this that defined law and grounded 
the connection between law and morality, then it seems plausible that we 
could conclude that Fuller was indeed a functionalist as Moore claims.94 Of 
course, if this is the case, then the well-known critique that Fuller’s inner 
morality of law amounts to nothing more than instrumental efficiency is 
correct.95 
However, it seems that Fuller, in a quite characteristic manner, 
referred to the function of law as being concerned with the guidance of 
human conduct in accordance with general rules without intending to 
commit himself to the functionalist approach of defining law by the 
functions that it serves and assessing its morality in light of those functions. 
Fuller argued that law was functional in the sense that it has functions which 
can be achieved by subjecting human conduct to the governance of general 
rules. Gardner is quite right to say that Fuller did not conceive of this 
subjection as the purpose of law; rather it is a means of achieving the ends 
that law might be put to.96 Fuller himself noted that legal systems can serve 
“objectives … of the most diverse nature”.97  
It seems that Fuller's account, despite him describing law as 
functional, does not fall into the functionalist camp, distinguished by an 
approach of defining law by reference to its functions. However, this does 
not necessarily mean that his theory is modal either in that it defines law by 
reference to legal means. It is true that Fuller saw the rule of law as 
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concerned with ensuring that human conduct could be guided in 
accordance with general rules. Fuller’s theory is certainly premised on the 
belief that the subjection of human conduct to the governance of general 
rules is a means of achieving certain legal ends. However, Fuller's work on 
means and ends attempted to shift focus away from functionalist 
approaches which identify ends in abstraction from the means used to 
achieve those ends.98  
The crux of his argument against functionalism can be seen when we 
examine his critique of utilitarianism and the analogy to architecture 
mentioned above. Fuller adamantly resisted the claim that rules of action 
“must take their whole character and colour from the end to which they are 
sub-servient” and stressed that no end can remain unaffected by the means 
through which it is pursued.99 As Rundle notes, this is clearly not an 
instrumentalist or “modal” understanding of legal form - such an 
interpretation would be antithetical to the whole tenor of Fuller's work.100 
Note, however, that while Rundle challenges Gardner’s analysis, she 
remains wedded to an interpretation of Fuller which is almost exclusively 
focused on the “formality” of law and fails to lend appropriate weight to 
the aspects of Fuller’s theory which do not focus on legal form and instead 
focus on the integrity of the legal system as a whole. Her approach 
emphasises how legal form and legal ends are mutually transformative, but 
this is only one aspect of Fuller’s inner morality of law and Rundle at times 
places too much emphasis on this point to the exclusion of other, equally 
important aspects of his work. In addition, Rundle’s commitment to 
reclaiming Fuller on Fuller’s own terms amounts to “a collection of 
reminders about what the commitments of Fuller’s jurisprudence actually 
are”.101 While this is undoubtedly an important and valuable task, the 
critique ultimately fails to acknowledge how Gardner’s contribution might 
generate considerable scope to expand upon Fuller’s analysis through an 
increased emphasis on the rights which are implicit within a Fullerian 
account of the rule of law. This lens could arguably be used to show that 
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any conception of the rule of law will necessarily imply respect for the rights 
of legal subjects qua legal subjects.  
Fuller’s theory actually says very little about means; it says quite a 
lot about the form of legal norms, the ways in which restrictions on form 
affect and limit the ends which might legitimately be pursued through law, 
and the internal coherence and integrity of a legal system as a whole, but 
very little about legal means. Furthermore, even if the rule of law were 
primarily seen as a means to an end, this does not mean that it would not 
pass judgement on legal ends. A hammer is a very efficient tool for some 
purposes and completely useless for others. Inherent in the instrumentalist 
conception of the law lies a commitment to recognising that the rule of law 
does in fact stipulate certain ends as appropriate legal ends and certain ends 
as inappropriate legal ends.102 Legal form may simply be unsuited to or 
incapable of guaranteeing the attainment of certain ends.  
A system of law is never neutral with regards to the ends that can be 
pursued through it; many ends can never be attained through the use of 
law. Legality limits the range of possible ends that can be classed as legal 
ends. Even a purely instrumentalist conception of law must recognise that 
the very instrumentality of law ensures that certain ends or goals are simply 
incompatible with that instrument. The judgement of those ends is not 
necessarily left to “external” standards; an instrumentalist conception of 
law may reject internal standards grounded in morality, but it necessitates 
standards grounded in efficacy. Such an approach would evidently reject 
necessary connections between law and morality, but it cannot hold fast to 
the contention that legal ends are judged solely and exclusively by external 
standards.  
Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the rule of law is not 
instrumental: it is not exclusively a means to an end. The rule of law is 
always a theory which weaves a path through form and function, resisting 
any sharp distinction between either and emphasising their mutually 
transformative nature. Maintaining a neat dichotomy between formal and 
substantive, or modal and functional theories of the rule of law only serves 
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to prop up a distinction which would be better abandoned in favor of a 
more nuanced account which recognizes that these concepts are so 
intimately connected that they make poor foundations for conceptual or 
theoretical distinctions. Once we recognise that the rule of law renders these 
concepts unintelligible without reference to each other, it becomes clear that 
any distinction between formal and substantive, or modal and functional 
theories is unsustainable.  
 
VII. LEGALITY AND JUSTICE 
Returning to the three key distinctions between formal and substantive 
conceptions of the rule of law, all that remains is a distinction between 
conceptions of legality which guarantee the justice of all laws and those 
which can account for some unjust laws. Indeed, this appears to be the real 
distinction relied on by Craig in his analysis. In rejecting an interpretation 
of Dicey’s theory as substantive, he argues that “Dicey was under no 
illusion that all English laws were substantively just”.103 In particular, Craig 
stresses that Raz and Dworkin agree that “the adoption of a fully 
substantive conception of the rule of law has the consequence of robbing 
the concept of any function which is independent of the theory of justice 
which imbues such an account of law”.104 
 If this is all that distinguishes some conceptions of the rule of law 
from others, then it makes little sense to conceive of Fuller’s or Dicey’s 
conceptions as in any way “formal”. There is evidently a commitment to an 
ideal of good law-making which limits the content of legal rules and entails 
respect for the fundamental rights of the legal subject. What remains is a 
jurisprudential distinction concerning the nature of law, a distinction which 
is broadly anti-positivist insofar as one accepts a necessary connection 
between law and the rule of law. On the one hand, there is an interpretative 
conception of legality which “does not distinguish … between the rule of 
law and substantive justice”.105 On the other, there is a concept of legality 
which leaves room for rule of law compliant laws which are nevertheless 
unjust. Indeed, adherence to the rule of law as Fuller or Dicey envisaged it 
does appear to leave room for substantively unjust laws even if it might 
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guarantee some basic degree of justice and fairness. Returning to the words 
of Lord Steyn, the rule of law, on this conception, “enforces minimum 
standards of fairness, both substantive and procedural”.106 One can embrace 
a conception of the rule of law which is intimately connected to standards 
of justice without fully committing to a Dworkinian account which 
necessarily guarantees the “goodness” of all laws. In a similar vein, honesty 
can be a virtue, even if being honest might be compatible with great 
cruelty.107 The fact that being honest does not guarantee the substantive 
goodness of one’s conduct does not invalidate its status as a virtue.  
 It seems that Craig’s analysis cannot accommodate such a 
conception, however. His idea of what makes a theory “substantive” is 
intimately connected to this particular jurisprudential commitment; as if a 
conception of the rule of law which affects legal content and respects legal 
rights necessarily also embraces this broader natural law position that law, 
properly understood, can only be morally good law. Fuller would clearly 
reject such a contention and would insist that legality contains its own 
moral standards even if it remains neutral across a vast array of legal 
ends.108 There is room for external moral standards on this conception, even 
if the principles of legality demand adherence to some basic conceptions of 
justice which arises internally.  
 Raz argues that “[i]f the rule of law is the rule of good law then to 
explain its nature is to propound a complete social philosophy. But if so the 
term lacks any useful function.”109 I suggest that, if the rule of law is a 
political ideal, then it must be the rule of good law, but that this does not 
necessarily require a commitment to the claim that legality and justice 
collapse into one another. Many conceptions of the rule of law entail respect 
for fundamental rights without resulting in this much broader commitment 
to a complete social philosophy.110 A rule of law compliant legal system may 
leave open the choice between differing conceptions of justice even if it 
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must commit to respecting the legal subject as a moral entity with certain 
minimum rights to the protection of law.  
If, as Raz and Gardner argue, the rule of law is a political ideal, then 
it is by definition dependent on notions of good law (that which conforms 
to the ideal) and bad law (that which fails to conform to the ideal). Raz 
resists recognising a connection between the rule of law and theories of 
justice because he thinks it will rob the rule of law of any independent value. 
However, the rule of law can be of no value unless it is a commitment to 
some notion of good law, even if that good law could be compatible with 
great inequity.111 As Allan observes, Raz is torn between two paths: the rule 




The rule of law necessitates analysis of the products and practices of legal 
officials and an evaluation of those products and practices to see if they are 
in conformity with this political ideal. The rule of law, even on the thinnest 
account, is a nuanced confluence of divergent principles which manifest 
within law subtle pressure towards integrity as a cohesive whole.113  
In light of these conclusions, it seems quite improbable that we can 
maintain a neat distinction between formal and substantive conceptions of 
the rule of law. A rule of law compliant legal system is one which manifestly 
protects the fundamental rights of legal subjects and which precludes 
certain legal ends from being classed as examples of the law’s legitimate 
functions. Inherent within the concept of a legal subject lies the rights 
entailed by fidelity to the rule of law. Inherent within the concept of a legal 
system lies restrictions on governmental power and duties to protect and 
respect the rights of legal subjects. This ensures that the rule of law cannot 
be portrayed as content-neutral, mere tools to be put to whatever purposes 
a political ruler might wish. Fidelity to the rule of law may not guarantee 
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that all products of that system are benign and morally acceptable, but at 
the very minimum, it ensures that some rights are protected, and some 
restrictions are placed on legal content and legal ends. The rule of law, on 
this conception, is always simultaneously concerned with the bare 
minimum threshold conditions of legality as well as the aspirational ideals 
which serve as “distinct standards by which excellence in legality may be 
tested”.114 
Attempts to distinguish between formal and substantive or modal 
and functional conceptions of the rule of law inevitably fail. These 
dichotomies have shifting baselines, are completely context-dependent and 
even the multitude of meanings that could be attributed to those terms do 
not reflect the nature of the theories they purport to explain. The 
form/substance dichotomy, and its re-imagining in the modal/functional 
dichotomy, offer us nothing more than confusion and obfuscation. If 
Gardner is correct that the rule of law speaks to legal content and implies 
the existence of fundamental rights, then his characterisation of it as modal 
and instrumental is unsustainable.   
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